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INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan delivered to the American 
people his proposal which has since become familiar as the "Star 
Wars" speech, advocating a renewal of concerted effort to build 
a nationwide defense against nuclear missiles. Encouraged by reports 
of emerging technologies which might be suitable for Ballistic Missile 
Defenses (BMD), the President called on the scientific community to 
"give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and 
obsolete." Though this specific goal has since been widely pronounced 
a8 impossible for any time other than perhaps the most distant future, 
the President's speech sparked a renewed debate among policymakers, 
scientists, and the generML public over the possibilities and the 
implications of Ballistic Missile Defense. The purpose of this 
paper is to assess this debate, by examining the current technological 
and strategic base for a national effort into BMD, such as that 
proposed by President Reagan.
The President's concept was not new, of course; hopes for 
defense against enemy missiles grew naturally from effort to 
build air defenses against enemy bombers during the Second World 
War. In 1946, the U.S. Air Force became the Thumper and Wizard
( 2 )
programs, intended to explore the technical requisites for shooting 
down incoming missiles. Though both programs were to be dis­
continued, the U.S. Army began development in 1955 of the Nike- 
Zeus system, which was to become the conceptual basis for all 
U.S. BMD systems.*
From the very beginning, doubts were raised about the 
feasibility of protecting the U.S. from Soviet missiles. Though 
most scientists felt that the basic structure of the Nike concept 
was attainable, concerns were voiced about possible counter­
measures that the Soviets might take to thwart the U.S. de­
fensive system, the most obvious one being an extensive build­
up of their own missile forces, which would enable them to 
overwhelm the Nike system. Interservice rivalry played a part 
in the debate, with the Air Force arguing that the U.S. was better 
off spending the money from the Army's Nike program on offensive 
forces. Others, such as Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, 
argued that the emphasis on building an active defense against 
Soviet missiles would draw money away from other programs, such 
as Civil Defense, which they felt were more cost-effective and 
provided a batter chance of protecting the population.
Still, the notion of defending oneselvea against attack 
flows naturally from perceptions of a hostile world; and while 
the missile defense program was the subject of controversy 
among policymakers and defense analysts, the American public 
was enthusiastically behind the program. Each time Seceretary
( 3 )
McNamara seemed close to killing the program che Army supporters 
were able to go to Congress and restore funding for continued 
development. In addition, technological advances9 such as the 
development of high-speed rocket interceptors and phased array 
radars9 began to mute some of the doubts concerning the Nike-X 
(the successor to the Nide-Zeus) system's potential efficiency.
By 1966, the issue of Anti-Ballistic Missile defenses 
(or ABM) had come to the center of most defense debates. In 
the fiscal 1968 budget9 President Johnson requested several 
hundred million dollars to begin production of the initial 
components of the Nike-X system, but proposed that the money be 
set aside until the United States had explored opportunities 
with the Soviet Union for reaching an arms control agreement 
which might limit ABM deployments. Initial efforts were un­
successful, and the United States began to prepare for production 
of the Sentinel project, which would provide "thin" protection to 
cities and other urban-industrial are s. When the particulars 
of this system, such as the deployment of nuclear armed inter­
ceptor rockets near major cities became public, however, popular 
opinion seemed to shift considerably, and officials began to 
reassess the political risks of supporting the ABM effort.
The incoming Nixon Administrat ion su.pended the Sentinel program 
as part of a full review of U. S. strategic policy. By the time 
the new Administration announced their revised missile defense 
program--"$afefuard"— opposition had grown so strong in the 
Senate that Vice-President Agnew had to cast the tie-breaking
U )
vote to authorize the first phase.
During this time, the Soviets were also at work on their 
own ABM program. By 1970, they had begun deployment of the 
Galosh interceptor system around Moscow, and seemed ready 
to expand their effort. This undercut the ABM opposition in 
the U.S. to some extent, but many argued that the Soviet system 
was subject to the same limitations and the same vulnerability 
to countermeasures as was the U.S. Safeguard project. By May 
1971, however, the debate came to a sudden halt as negotiations 
continuing under the SALT talks begun in 1969 produced an 
agreement in principle against further development of ABM 
systems. Eventually, this agreement produced the 1972 ABM 
Treaty.
The meaning of the ABM Treaty is the subject of much debate. 
Some say that it represents an agreement between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union that the pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defense is a 
fruitless venture, one that would only result in an expanding 
arms race with neither sid^ receiving any net gain. BMD pro­
ponents argue that it was only a temporary agreement intended 
to curb the potential for a premature arms race while the 
technology to succesfully pursue missile defense was still 
in a nascent state. Still others view the ABM Treaty primarily 
as a confirmation of the present structure of nuclear stability 
based on offensive deterrence.
The terms of the Treaty seem quite explicit. Article I
2
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bans Che deployment of ABM systems other than the two excep­
tions noted in Article III, which allows each side to deploy 
systems around both their national capitol and an ICBM 
silo field of their choice. These permitted ABM systems are 
not to exceed one hundred interceptor rockets, and the number 
and size of the allowable radar systems are also itemized in 
Article III. Article V spells out limits on development and 
testing of ABM systems, particularly tho^;e that are sea-based, 
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Article XIII pre­
scribes the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission 
for the purpose of periodically reviewing the treaty and to 
allow either side to raise questions or objections concerning 
compliance by the other.
The actual interpretation of these provisions, however, 
is in many ways an extrapolation of one's view of the broader 
meaning of the Treaty. This point is best exemplified by 
the current debate over the Reagan Administration's "broad" 
interpretation, which is intended to allow the U.S. Department 
of Defense to proceed with tests of new missile defense concepts. 
Regardless, there seems to be little dispute that the 1972 ABM 
Treaty is the most significant arms control agreement to be 
reached by the two superpowers; consequently, the disposition 
of the current debate over President Reagan's Strategic Defense 
program will have a major impact on the future of U.S.-Soviet 
arms control negotiations.
During the roughly ten years tk«t separated the signing of
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the ABM Treaty and President Reagan's Star Wars Speech* neither 
side completely discontinued their efforts in BHD. Though 
the U.S. never exercised the option of deploying a limited 
defence around Washington D.C., and dismantled the other 
permitted deployment at Grand Forks* AFB in the mid-sevent ies, 
efforts were continued to explore new technologies which could 
overcome some of the inherent vulnerabilities of the ABMs of 
the sixties and seventies. The Soviets* for their part* 
pursued an aggressive research program of their own, and also 
maintained and upgraded the Galosh system surrounding Moscow. 
Recent advancements for the Soviets include the development of 
the mobile ABM-X-3, which could potentially provide a rapidly 
deployed BHD in times of crisis or hostility. In addition* 
there is the disturbing matter of the large, phased-array 
radar recently constructed near Xrasnyorsk in a manner in­
consistent with the provisions in the 1972 Treaty. In sum, 
neither the U.S. nor the Soviets foreswore future Ballistic 
Missile Defenses completely whe.i they signed the 1972 Treaty, 
and both felt it a prudent hedge against the other's program 
to continue their own research.
Though the U.S. had maintained an active research program 
which explored emerging BHD technologies, the President's speech 
in March 1983 took most Americans by surprise. Perhaps cue 
reason for the subsequent uproar over the President's plans for 
a "strategic defense" was the rather unprecedented nature of
( 7 )
the speech itself. Never before had a United States president
publicly announced such a radically new venture in American
defense policy, without the prior knowledge of his advisors
and many in the defense community. But Reagan reportedly had
only shown the text of his speech to a few close confidants,
and even some of the President’s key officials in the Pentagon
4
were taken by surprise. For both the Administration's sup­
porters and its detractors, it was immediately apparent that 
the President's proposal was a fantastic departure from the 
prevailing U.S. policy on nuclear war.
In May (984, ten weeks after the President’s speech, the 
White House initiated three separate studies of the President’s 
proposal. The "FJtfoher Commission'1 was charged with examining 
the technical aspects of strategic defense, while the Hoffman 
and Miller panels looked at the strategic and political im­
plications of a renewed BMD effortCthe Hoffman group consisted 
mainly of outside experts, while the Miller panel was an inter-
5
agency forum). All three panels reported back in October, and 
the White House, content that their findings warranted setting 
up a formal BMD program, initiated the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization (SDIO) in January 1984.
Today, the debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative is 
the most controversial defense topic in the United States, 
and perhaps the entire Western community. SDI has attrateted 
ardent supporters and fervent opposition in the scientific 
community, in defense policy circles, and among the general
( 8 )
public. At least one presidential candidate for 1988 has made 
SDI the central topic of his campaign.6 The outcome of the 
ongoing debate has obvious implications not only for defense 
issues or national security policy, but for national economic 
policy and for East-West relations in general. Because of the 
long-term nature of the Strategic Defense program, and also 
because of the radical departure from the present system of 
maintaining nuclear stability which the President's proposal 
represents, policies formulated today will carry their legacy 
well into the next century.
In what follows, I shall first give a general technical 
overview of the strategic defense program--wh ich technologies 
are being explored, what their advantages and drawbacks are, 
and what most scientists seem to think will be the potential 
for their contribution to BMD. I will also touch on the 
questions concerning our ability eventually to integrate some 
of these emerging technologies into a comprehensive, coordin­
ated system. Though usually ar ane to non-scientists like 
myself, it is crucial to understand the technical aspects of 
the debate; technology is, in most ways, the factor limiting 
how far we can eventually go in our pursuit of effective BMD. 
While President Reagan called on American scientists to give 
us the means for making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", 
Soviet leaders will undoubtedly call on their scientists 
to give them the means for defeating any American BMD system, 
as well as for acquiring one of their own.
( 9 )
The second part of this paper will provide a review of 
some of the strategic implications which would arise as a result 
of BMD deployment, as well as continued research and development. 
It is important to assess the impact of SDI on the nuclear 
balance in both the near-term and the long-term. One part 
of this assessment will involve postulating different scenarios 
for the deployment of BMDs of varyiug levels of effectiveness, 
and then speculating about the effect on the nuclear war 
strategies of both superpowers.
Finally, I shall argue that, regardless of decisions 
made on the technological and strategic consequences of BMD, 
basic research into new technologies that are associated with 
BMD missions will continue in both the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Though arms control negotiations may well be 
able to continue the present ban on advanced testing of ABM 
prototypes and their deployment, basic research will continue, 
because of problems related to verifying bans on such research, 
as well as other factors that have to do with the dynamics 
of the arms race. The problem then is how to manage these 
programs in basic BMD research while also minimizing the 
impetus for their deployment, particularly when the concepts and 
implications are still not well understood. I will offer three 
possibilities, though there are surely many others.
It is important that the debate over BMD be careful, 
prescient, and exceedingly thorough; above ail, we must keep
( 10 )
in mind that our primary objective is the continued prevention 
of a nuclear disaster.
I I
TECHNOLOGY
In order to lay the basis for a discussion of the tech­
nological concepts behind the new BMD program, we must first 
consider the four stages of flight through which a ballistic 
missile travels from launch to target; each stage is distinct, 
and would present specific problems to a defense trying to 
destroy the incoming missile.
The first stage is ''boost-phase", which lasts currently 
anywhere from three to five minutes and covers the first 
200-300 kilometers of the missile's ascent. The next phase 
is "post-boost", in which the missile's bus deploys the in­
dividual warheads on their own separate trajectories; post­
boost lasts anywhere from two to five minutes for present 
missiles. The third stage is mid-course, lasting about twenty 
to twenty*five minutes, in which the warheads travel through 
the vacuum of space. The last stage, the terminal phase, begins 
when the incoming warheads re-enter the atmosphere and descend 
toward their target.
The old ABM systems of the sixties and seventies relied 
exclusively on intercepting incoming warheads during the terminal
( I I )
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stage as they rained down on the target. Essentially, this involved 
hitting a missile with a missile, a formidable technological challenge, 
particularly with the primitive tracking and aiming technology 
of that time. Later advances, such as phased-array radars and 
new, high-speed interceptors such as the Sprint missile, pro­
vided new advantages to the defense, but these advantages were 
effectively negated with the introduction of MIRV missiles.
MIRV is an acronymn for "Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry 
Vehicles", and refers to the ability for a single missile to carry 
a number of warheads, which are deployed independently during 
post-boost, as mentioned above. The introduction of MIRV tech­
nology greatly enhanced the ability of the offense to overwhelm 
any defensive system. Many individuals suggest that this early 
pattern, in which new technologies alternately present one side 
with an advantage and then the other side with the capacity to over­
come that advantage, embodies a perpetual pattern of shifting 
offense-defense superiority. It should not be surprising that 
these individuals are disinclined to support a renewed BMD effort, 
which they believe can only result in, at best, a temporary 
advantage.
The new concepts of BMD presently being forwarded go beyond the 
previous notions of ABM and entail intercept during the boost- 
phase and mid-course stages of ICBM flight. The hope is that, 
by intercept'ng a certain percentage of enemy warheads during 
each stage, a missile attack could be stopped by attrition.
For example, if a defensive system could intercept 90% of enemy 
missiles during the boost/poet-boost stages, end 90% of whet is
( 13)
left during the successive two stages, it would have stopped 
all but 0.1% of the attacking missiles. Another rationale 
for the "layered defense" approach is that it would charge the 
offense a "penalty" for each countermeasure it would use in 
an attempt to overcome each layer of defense: by attacking
the missiles in four "different" ways, the enemy must find 
four different ways to enhance his missiles' chances of success­
fully penetrating the defense.
Each layer of 1CBM flight patterns presents particular 
requirements to the defense. In addition, there are specific 
countermeasures which can be employed by the offense in an 
attempt to overcome the defense, as just alluded to above. The 
subject of countermeasures is crucial to the question of the 
ultimate effectiveness of any BMD system, and will be dealt with 
in a later section. For now, we will turn to th* general 
requirements of a potential defensive system.
All potential BMD missions must perform sever* i key 
functions, including surveillance, tracking of enemy m i s s i e s  or 
warheads, target acquisition, the actual ; * action of the 
enemy missile itself, kill assessment, and tri*n repeated 
attack if necessary. These functions must al be performed 
for each of the four stages of ICBM f ight, aid some, such 
as tracking and kill assessment, woul i e tail "handing off 
information form one layer of the def ns * to the next.
The effectiveness of the boos t-ph as e intercept is abs > 1 ute1y 
crucial for the effectiveness of the entire system. Durin 
boost-phase, the launch vehicle(bus) has not yet released its
( l A )
warheads, so by destroying one missile, the defense could 
knock out a number of warheads. Once the warheads are deployed, 
however, the number of targets which must he destroyed increases 
tremendously, as does the potential to overwhelm the entire 
defense system. Also, the booster rockets which propel the 
missile upward through the atmosphere are both easier to 
track and easier to destroy than the warheads which are sub­
sequently deployed. for these reasons, the establishment of 
a reliable, effective boost-phase intercept is seen as a 
requisite to any potential BMO system.7
Mid-course interception is generally considered an easier 
task than boost-phase intercept from a technological stand­
point, because of the increase in time available to destroy 
successfully the warheads. On the other hand, mid-course 
flight presents a unique problem for the defense in discrimin­
ating objects as they pass through space. As mentioned, the 
number of targets that must be killed will be signifleantly 
greater in this stage as opposed to boost-phase. But because 
space is a vacuum, where no friction acts on moving objects, 
a missile can deploy hundreds of decoys along with the actual 
warheads. These decoys would be much lighter than the warheads, 
but would be of the same approximate size and shape, and thus 
would give off the same infrared image as the warheads them­
selves Thus, if a defense is to have any chance of succeeding 
i i t  s m - s i  , way must be found for distinguishing these 
dec s from w rhea^s. In tddition, the offense may also deploy 
"sensit inhibit ors'1 such as chaff, which are long, thin wires
( 15)
that would surround the warheads and decoys, confusing attempts 
at discriminating them, or aerosol clouds which would be 
released around the warheads for the same effect. Finally, 
we should note that warheads, bec ’ se they are hardened to 
withstand the pressure of re-entering the atmosphere, would be 
more difficult to destroy than the thinner, more complex booster 
missiles .
Terminal stage intercept is the most developed of the 
proposed BMD layers because of its longer history as a defense 
concept, but the primary limitations on its effectiveness are 
time and the consequences of destroying an enemy warhead as it 
nears the target. However, the defence mission is made some­
what easier by the presence of atmospheric drag, which would 
separate the incoming warheads from the lighter decoys, thus 
reducing the number of targets which must be airacked. Still, 
terminal defense is seen only as having limited potential, and 
would be relied on in a layered defense for just mopping up 
the few warheads that managed to pass through the other layers 
intact .
Several different new technologies have been suggested 
for use in a layered defensive system. The most exotic of these 
are Directed Energy Weapons(D E W s ), which include several dif­
ferent classes of lasers, as well as particle beams. Emphasis 
hat also been placed on the development of high-powered Kinetic 
Kill Veh icles(KKVs), which would destroy missiles or warheads 
by impact. Finally, concepts have been advanced which would 
improve the presently-avail able homing technology for terminal
' 1 6 )
intercept using rockets armed with conventional-explosive 
warheads, as oppossed to the nuclear warheads previously 
necessary for ABM interceptors.
Regardless of the technologies employed, a layered defense 
would require the basing of at least some components in spa 'e. 
This will mean certain problems that will have to be solved 
if the defense is to be able to survive long enough to carry 
out its mission. Currently, both the United States and the 
Soviet Union rely on satellites to carry out a wide range of 
surveillance functions. In a future BMD regime, these satellites 
would be augmented by others intended to perform various battle 
management operation, such as "birth-to-deathM tracking, or 
targeting for weapons components. It is probable that some or 
most of the weapons components themselves will have to be 
space-based as well. As we shall see, this presents certain 
challenges for the defense to overcome the vulnerability of these 
space-based components to direct attack. In addition, the 
necessity of space-based components also vastly increases the 
cost of any potential system, since it now costs thousands of 
dollars for each pound of material to be put into orbit, and 
most of the space-based components would be of considerable 
weight; eventually, deployment of a space-based defensive system
would require the development of a "super shuttle" to bring down
g
the deployment costs to a feasible level. Finally, basing of 
components in space requires a trade-off between the distance 
from which the component will orbit the earth, and its per­
formance requirements. Because of the earth's rotation,
( 1 7 )
objects in orbit can only remain over the same spot of the 
earth if they are orbiting at 40,000 KM, or "geosynchronous 
orbit"(GEG). Obviously, this is going to greatly increase the 
level of performance necessary for, say, a laser trying to 
attack a missile in the outer reaches of the e a r t h’s atmos­
phere. Deploying the components any lower though would present 
an "absentee factor": only a certain number would be in pf c. i t on 
over the Soviet ICBM fields at any given time. Thus, in order 
to ensure constant coverage, a redundant number of these com­
ponents would have to be deployed.
As ought to be apparent already from this very brief 
overview of the BMD mission, constructing a reliable and 
effective defensive system will be an enormously complex and 
demanding task, one which may not be possible at all, even 
in the face of rapid future advances in technology. We will 
now consider some of the specific technologies which precipi­
tated the current optimism among the proponents of BMD.
Directed Energy Weapons
Recent advances in Directed Energy Weapon technology are 
the primary reason that many say it is time to reassess the 
role of BMD. The crucial advantage of DEWs is that their beams 
travel at the speed of light, which makes them the only really 
attractive candidates for boost-phase intercept. Interception 
by other means is considered too slow to destroy a significant 
number of enemy missiles in the three to five minutes before 
they deploy their warheads, especially in light of the fact that 
moat experts believe that fast-burn boosters may soon shorten the
( 1 8 )
boost-phase to under ninety seconds. In addition, missiles 
travel at speeds of over 6 km/second; by the time a convent­
ional interceptor travels from firing to impact, the target has 
likely moved about 1500 kilometers, complicating, quite ob­
viously, the task of interception. But speed-of-light DEWs 
could reach their target before it has h*d a chance to move 
appr #c i a bly,
DEWs are also being considered for a role in mid-course 
discrimination. Recall the problem mentioned earlier in dis­
criminating warheads from decoys as they travel through space. 
One way of solving this problem might be the use of ’interactive 
discrimination”, in which some device, in this case a DEW, 
would impart a certain amount of energy on the objects to be 
discriminated. By passively observing the effect of the 
energy on each object's trajectory, sensors might be able to 
determine the lighter objects from the heavier ones, and 
distinguish the actual warheads from the decoys.
To date, the most mature of the DEW technologies is the 
chemical laser, which turns the energy of a chemical reaction 
into infrared light. This IR light then takes the form of a 
concentrated beam, which would be focused on the target, heating 
the point oi contact and causing the outer layer to melt. 
Currentlyt the most popular candidate is a Hydrogen-Flouride(H F ) 
laser; two other possibilities under consideration are the 
Deterium(DF) laser, and a laser powered by atomic iodine.
Harold Brown estimates that chemical lasers could reach a state 
of development suitable to actual deployment by 2005-2010, but
( 19)
these would be powerful enough only for ASAT(Anti-Satel 1 ite)
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purposes. The American Physical Society Study Group on 
Directed Energy Weapons estimates that the HF/DF lasers need 
improvements of at least two orders of magnitude over presently 
demonstrated power levels in order to be effective as a kill 
weapon; atomic iodine lasers would need improvements on the 
order of f ive. *^
There are a number of problems with the chemical lasers 
which would limit their contribution to a BMD system, however.
One is the problem of developing a laser of the requisite 
strength while at the same time controlling the beam's diver­
gence. Some physicists suggest that current power levels 
attainable from chemical lasers in the labratory represent the 
upper levels that can be produced from this type of power source. 
If this is true, then chemical lasers have little potential for 
performing the essential kill function in a BMD system. Others, 
however, have suggested a number of means which may be able to 
compensate for this drawback, for example, locking the beams 
of several lasers together, or the use of phase-conjugation 
techniques or adaptive optics to correct for dispersion of the 
beam. These technologies are only beginning to be explored.
Another obstacle, much more daunting from an engineering 
standpoint, is the fact that infrared light waves, at approxi­
mately 2.7 micrometers, cannot penetrate the atmosphere; thus, 
chemical lasers would have to be deployed in space. This is 
troublesome because these lasers would be very heavy: the fuel 
alone for a constellation of 100 would weigh in excess of
( 2 0 )
16,000 tons, which is the equivalent of 250 present shuttle
l o a d s . 11 Such tremendous weight would probably make them
1 2
prohibitively expensive to deploy. Additionally, the lasers
would not be powerful enough to be effective from geosynchronous
orbit, and would thus have to be deployed in Low-Earth Orbit
(LEO). This would bring up the absentee problem mentioned
earlier. Based on the Fletcher Committee prescription of a
realistic power level for future chemical lasers, it has beer
estimated that anywhere from 320-460 orbiting stations armed
with these types of lasers would be needed to ensure adequate
1 3
coverage against current Soviet force levels. There seems to 
be little reason to disbelieve the summary judgment of one 
analyst that, based on what we know at this time, chemical
14
lasers are 11 technically feasible, but ineffective as a system."
Another prospective DEW technology being explored is exc imer
lasers, which emit a beam of energy in the form of ultraviolet
light. As with chemical lasers, excimer lasers would burn a
hole in the target and disrupt the internal electronics of the
missile. The lasing action would b. caused by a compound of
a noble gas and a halogen; wavelength would be 0.3 micrometers,
thus capable of being transmitted through the atmosphere,
though methods would have to be developed to correct for
absorption and distortion.
Excimer lasers would have to be deployed on the ground, 
since they could weigh as much as sixty times that of 
chemical lasers. This would raise difficulties which apply to 
all ground-based lasers. First, the beams would have to be 
deflected off of large mirrors bit ing at GEO in order to be
(2 1)
directed toward the target. This increases the distance which
the beam must travel by well over a factor of ‘wo, requiring a
much stronger beam than if the laser were placed in orbit.
The manner in which energy beams could be propagated, bounced
off mirrors, and accurately pointed towards the target is still
being explored. Another important issue concerning space-
based mirrors is their vulnerability. They would likely have
! 5
to be much larger than any built on earth thus far, and 
wou.d be both difficult to manuever in order to avoid direct 
attack, and difficult to repair if damaged in any way (remember, 
the repairs must be made in space). The APS Study Group also 
notes that the reflective coating on these mirrors would be 
particularly vulnerable to the radiation of other lasers.^ ^
The second difficulty with ground-based lasers is that the 
beams would be unable to penetrate cloud cover effectively. As 
a result, it would be necessary to base lasers in at least 
seven or so different geographical areas to ensure that lasers 
would always be available, regardless of the w e a t h e r . ^  Such 
redundancy, however, would provide an incidental advantage 
against a preemptive strike since an attacker would have to 
take out all seven lasers.
One particular drawback to excimer lasers is the immense 
power requirements that result from their low level of efficiency. 
At present, excimer lasers can only convert six percent of their 
total power consumption into the energy beam itself. As a 
consequence, the U.S. would need to generate the power output 
of 160 full-size electrical power stations, at a likely cost of
( 2 2 )
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over $50 billion. Finally, excimer laser technology is still 
well short of the power necessary to perform a viable BHD role; 
estimates call for an increase of at least four orders of 
magn i t ude . * ^
Another DEW possibility, much less developed than the 
chemical and the excimer lasers, would be the Free-Elect ron 
Laser(FEL). The FEL would propagate a beam of varying wave­
lengths from high-energy electrons. Though lighter and probably 
more efficient than the excimer laser, it .vould probably be 
ground-based as well, and would thus face the obstacles of 
large, vulnerable mirrors in space, and cloud cover. Atmospheric 
distortion of the beam would have to bu corrected, but it is 
difficult to even speculate on the role which FELs might play
in a Ballistic Missile Defense because, as has been noted, they
20
still "require the validation of several physical concepts."
One technology that is still in a very nascent stage but
may hold considerable promise would be Neutral Particle 
Beams(NPBs). This type of weapon would work as follows: 
"...atomic particles accelerated to a high speed in charged 
form by an electrical field in an accelerator, steered and 
pointed by a magnet, and then neutralized so as not to be de- 
fleeted by the earth’s magnetic field." The energy beam 
would penetrate deeply into the missile or warhead and skew 
the electronk guidance or detonation systems. One particularly 
attractive feature of NPBs is that they could be steered by 
a magnet, which would allow for a rapid fire-retarget-fire 
sequence; such quick re-targeting may be essential for effective 
defensive coverage during the relatively quick boost-pt ise.
( 2 3 )
Thor !i f he bean o 1 an NPB would be neutralized to avoid 
deflection, the atoms of the earn, on colliding with the air, 
would lose their extra electron, thus returning them to a 
charged state. As a consequence,the beam would then be 
subject to scattering within the atmosphere. It is estimated 
that this would occur at about 140 km altitude, which would 
mean that the weapon would have to be space-based. This 
presents a number of particular problems, in addition to the 
ones associated with space-basea lasers in general. First, the 
magnet required for steering the NPB would be very heavy, and 
thus expensive to deploy. Second, because the beam would travel 
through space in a neutral state, it would be virtually impos­
sible to track, since it does not give off heat, and is thus in­
visible to most means of passive observation( i.e ., infrared 
patterning). This would present specific obstacles to mon­
itoring and controlling the weapon's firing pattern.
Another limitation on NPBs is their inefficiency. Pre­
sently, NPBs are the "brightest"(most powerful) of the DEW con­
cepts advanced, but they only convert about ten percent of 
their power into beam energy. As with excimer lasers, this 
means that for an effective BMD weapon, the power require­
ments would be immense. The only way of providing that level 
of power in an orbiting component would be with a nuclear power 
source. Right now, there is no way possible to provide each
orbiting platform with a nuclear-powered reactor; the ability 
to do so will be a spectacular accomplishment in its own right.
(24 )
A final limitatic that has been suggested is that, 
because NPBs wo u l d n’t actually physically destroy their targets 
kill assessment would be much more difficult than is the case 
with other types of DEWs. This drawback has received precious 
little attention in the open literature, however, and given 
advances in interactive discrimination, it would seem to be 
the most soluabie of the NPBs problems.
The final DEW technology which is commonly considered to 
have a potential role in BMD is, by most accounts, the most 
primitive--the X-ray laser . X-ray laser weapons would be 
pumped by a nuclear bomb; the bomb would be encased in a 
materialCplastic, for instance) in which would be imbedded 
bundles of long, thin wires. When the bomb is detonated, an 
instantaneous lasing action would occur along the metal wires 
before theentire device is consumed in the explosion. These 
beams of energy would carry to the target, delivering a heavy 
jolt to the ICBM and searing a hole through the surface. The 
jolt would disrupt the missile's internal mechanisms and also 
throw the missile or warhead off its established trajectory. 
Because the X-ray beam would have a relatively wide angle, it 
could be suitable for destroying(or discriminating) clouds 
of objects.
Because X-ray lasers would be unable to penetrate the 
atmosphere deeply, they would have to be space-based. Further­
more, since X-ray lasers cannot be bounced off mirrors, the 
beam would have to be targeted directly from the exploding 
device to the individual targets. They would be considerably
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lighter than any of the other DEW concepts, and so would 
be relatively inexpensive to deploy in space. But because 
they can obviously be used only once, tens of thousands would 
have to be deployed to guard against an enemy choosing to fire 
his missiles a few at a time, instead of all at once. Moreover, 
the demonstration of the physics involved is at least ten 
years off, and the technology still needs an improvement of
at least four orders of magnitude over the level recommended
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as a demonstration goal for 1988.
One interesting concept that has been suggested as an 
alternative to pre-deploying X-ray laser weapons in space is 
that of "pop-up", which would entail keeping the weapons 
components on the ground--preferably in submarines, where 
they would be less vulnerable to attack--and then boosting them 
up at the first sign of a Soviet ICBM launch. This approach 
would negate the problem of vulnerability that all pre-deployed 
space-based components face. But "pop-up" deployment would 
entail severe restrictions as well. Most obvious would be the 
time constraints in confirming a launch, relaying the command 
to enact the defensive system, and getting the weapon high enough 
in the air to get a clean shot at he rising ICBMs before 
they ended their boost-phase. A udi < * r problem would be the 
positioning of the subs which were1 carrying the pop-up componets. 
They would have to be relatively close to Soviet ter r i t o r y  in 
order to provide the shortest distance upward to a clear line 
of five. This would mean th >: the submarines would have to 
be somewhere in the Indian Ocean or the Arctic Seas. Knowing
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this, the enemy enhances his capability to attempt to track 
and perhaps interfere with the sub, although current anti- 
sub fare is not of the type to allow this type of tracking at 
present. In sum, there is currently no basis for believing 
that "pop-up" deployment could happen fast enough and ef­
ficiently enough to make a real contribution to BMD, though, 
as with all of these technologies, nothing precludes further 
developments which could a u s e this assessment to change.
Kinet i c We apons
Kinetic weapons wo uId destroy targets by direct impact. 
Traditionally, this is close to the concept which underlay 
earlier notions of missile intercept, except that the earlier 
version' relied on getting only close enough to the target 
to detonate a nuclear explosive, the blast of which would 
actually perform the kill. Variations on this form of inter­
cept, which would rely on a conventional warhead as opposed 
to a nuclear one, are presently in a mature state of develop­
ment, and would likely play a crucial role in any near-term 
BMD. The primary barrier to their development presently is 
the production of a terminal homing capacity sufficient to 
get the interceptor close enough to the missile. Recent 
progress in this area includes the s ccessfui Homing 
Overlay Experiment in 1984, in which an interceptor engaged 
a reentry vehicle using a non-nuclear kill device. This ex­
periment was an important accomplishment in demonstrating the
ability to perform a high-alti t ude optical homing mission;
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this is a major step forw rd for terminal defense.
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Chemically propelled rockets have oeen suggested for 
possible use in boost-phase intercept. These would be launched 
from a pre-orbiting battle station, steered by reaction jets, 
and would destroy the target by impact. Because of their 
slowness, they would have to possess some way of actively 
homing the target, since the missile would have moved many 
kilometers since the interceptor had been launched. Such 
an active homing capability would probably involve infrared 
sensors, which raises another problem: As a missile ascends, 
the plume from its firing boosters gives off a "hot" image in 
infrared, which is much easier to distinguish than the "cold" 
image of the actual booster. The interceptor would have to 
be able to locate the missile within the plume.
One kinetic energy weapon receiving attention is the 
elect romagne t ic ra 11 g u n , which would accelerate "bullets" 
of some type by passing them through a long tube lined on 
either side with charged rails. The bullets would be expelled 
at a rate of speed much higher than self-propelled objects 
such as chemical rockets, and would destroy the target by 
impact. It is hoped that a system could be developed w h i m  
would be able to accelerate the interceptors at velocities 
of 20km/second or more. Even at this speed, the missile 
would still have moved considerably by the time the inter­
ceptor could get to it, and thus the interceptors would in­
dividually possess a homing device. One question often raised 
is whether or not the homing devices could survive such velocity, 
•specially if they would have to reenter the atmosphere to 
reach their target.
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There are other kinetic energy weapons cone pts which have
been advanced, such as the firing of a 11 shield" at pellets
in the face of boost-phase missiles beginni g their ascent.
Generally, these concepts are associated with the "High-Fron-
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tier" program promoted by Lt.Gen. Daniel Graham, and are
considered by most officials as offering little promise for 
contributing to an effective BMD system, at least for boost- 
phase intercept.
Eventually, Kinetic Kill Vehicles may be developed to 
the point where they could make a significant contribution to 
mid-course intercept, supplementing their more clearly defined 
role in terminal defense. There seems to be little optimism, 
though, that they might play a significant role in boost- 
phase intercept.
System Concepts
Thus far we have treated the individual weapons components 
themselves that are at the heart of the new BMD concepts.
But, obviously, these will have to be integrated with each 
other, and a system will need to be built which provides for
3
the essential 0 I functions--command, control, communication, 
and intelligence. The importance and difficulty of this 
task must not be understated. Charles Zraket writes that 
"The new defense weapons that have been receiving so much 
attention are to be but one part of a complex strategic 
system..." And the Fletcher Committee fully recognised the 
challenge presented when the panel on Battle Management, 
communications, tad Data Processing wrote in their final report
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to the President, "Specifying, generating, testing, and main­
taining the software for a battle management system will be 
a task that far exceeds in complexity and difficulty any that
has yet been accomplished in the production of military or
27
civilian software systems."
The first challenge to building an effective system 
will be that of architecture--finding the right mix of com­
ponents to complete the defense mission with the best perform­
ance at "reasonable cost", whatever that may be defined as.
The concept being advanced, remember, s that of a layered 
defense, and although Department of Defense literature calls
for each layer to function semi-autonomously, performing
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their own crucial tracking, firing, and kill assessment , 
these different layers will have to be in constant communication 
with each other. The performance of each layer will have 
tremendous bearing on how well the subsequent layers can complete 
their mission, since failure of one will likely overwhelm the 
next. As a precaution against such failure, each layer ought 
to be endowed with a certain redundancy as back-up, and the 
integration of the different layers ought to be such that, 
in the event of catastrophic failure of an earlier layer, the 
remaining system will "degrade gracefully," as opposed to 
collapsing altogether.
DOC remarks on "semi-autonomous" layers aside, the sharing 
of information between the different layers will have to be 
extensive. Information regarding targets, the nature and 
extent of the threat, and the success of each layer will have 
to be passed off from tier to tier. An example is the concept
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of "birth-to-death tracking," one way which it is hoped that 
the system will be able to overcome the problem of discrimin­
ating warheads from decoys. This would involve, as the name 
implies, continual tracking of each threatening object, from 
the moment it is deployed to the moment it is destroyed, 
which may be as late as the terminal phase. In order to 
accomplish this, information will have to be gathered from 
a variety of different sensors, correllated, and continually 
disseminated without confusing similar but separate objects 
as the missile travels through the different stages of flight. 
This is a daunting challenge, one well beyond the present- 
day capabilities of sensors and computers.
Information must also be able to enter and leave the
system from outside communication channels, if officials wish
to maintain proper control over the system. This is one of
the present controversies over BMD--whether or not there will
be time, given the need to intercept many or most of the
enemy's missiles in boost-phase, for national authorities to
maintain command over the system, or whether it will have to
be programed to respond automatically when it senses a Soviet
launch. Edward Teller, a staunch supporter of BMD, argues
for the latter case: "Decisions must be made in minutes,
even seconds. . . There is no perfect solution. We must be
satisfied with an imperfect solution. After careful consid-
29eration, the best alternative seems to be the computer."
But another analyst notes that there needs to be "jud­
icious control of weapons...striking a balance between readiness
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for use and assurance that use occurs only when and as in- 
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tended." It is impossible to predict the circumstances 
that will surround such an unlikely event as a nuclear attack, 
and officials will understandably wish to have the option 
to exercise discrimination in decision-making preserved, 
though the consequences of a rais-activation of the system 
would not be so severe as they first appear, given that most 
of the weapons in the BHD system would be non-nuclear and 
incapable of causing incidental damage to those on the ground. 
Still, rules of engagement will have to be formulated which 
will prevent the system from firing on, say, a peaceful space 
launch, or even on our own missiles during the course of a 
nuclear exchange.
The software requirements for all this are almost beyond
comprehension. Analysts estimate that the final system would
require anywhere from ten million to one-hundred million
integrated lines of code, far beyond anything ever attempted.
Zraket estimates that this would take up to "a few thousand"
professionals up to twenty years to complete the task of writing
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the software. Though recent advances in "artificial intel­
ligence" and automatic programming would help ease the dif­
ficulty of writing the codes, the software would still have 
to be designed by humans. In addition, it must be capable of 
being periodically tested and debugged; and because deployment o f 
a BMD is likely to be a gradual process, spread over many 
years, the software must be designed in a way that allows for 
the introduction of new components without having to re-write
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the entire program. In sum, Zraket is correct in writing
that the "ability to build thoroughly reliable and h gh-per-
formance command-and-control software could be the greatest
3 2challenge to achieving an effective BMD."
Finally, there will be no way of accurately testing the
entire system, and so it will have to work perfectly the first
time it is used. It must be capable of operating in a hostile
enviroment, and of defending itself against probable attack.
Also, because of the necessity to base at least some o r the
components in space, they will have to be able to perform
maintenance and self-repair, which no one had figured out how
to do. The "housekeeping" functions alone would require immense
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power and incredible foresight.
Countermeasures
So far, we have considered the technical require­
ments of BHD primarily from the perspective of the defense, 
which means we have described tteb obstacles as if the defense 
were intended to counter a generic, static opponent. But this 
is only half the equation; we must consider the fact that a 
future BMD will be going up against a responsive threat. The 
Soviets will naturally plan their offense in a way that best 
counters the U.S. defense by exploiting its weaknesses, and 
will, of course, continue work on their own BMD.
In many ways, the question of countermeasures cuts to the 
heart of the controversy surrounding BMD. Some say that the 
nature of technological competition is such thut advantages 
will always vacillate between the offense and ;he defense.
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The whole history of the arms race, they sayr is the history 
of superiority shifting from one side to the other, and it 
is foolish to hope for a final solution such as the one that 
Reagan has postulated.
Evidence of just such a shifting advantage is obvious in 
the history of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. postwar military competition. 
The Soviets have worked long and hard to build a national 
air-defense network to protect against the threat of enemy 
bombers, among other things. Yet, despite their extensive 
effort*, the SAC still remains confident in the ability of 
U.S. bombers to penetrate their airspace. We are currently 
at work on a new bomber, as well as the perfection of stealth 
technology, both of which will augment our abilities in this 
area. In addition to the development of HIRV technology to 
overcome possible ABM advances in the late sixties, there are 
other examples as well, such as cruise missiles, which can 
penetrate most modern radar undetected.
In this section, we will list the possible counter­
measures which could be used to defeat a BMD based on the 
techr 'ogies just covered. It should be obvious by then why so 
few analysts really believe that the President's desire for 
"perfect defense" could ever be realised. Though new tech­
nologies may develop for the defense, new technologies will 
undoubtedly be utilised by the offense to defeat the defense; 
there will never be a chance of ensuring that even a few 
missiles don't get through.
The first, and moat obvious Soviet response to deploy-
( 3 4 )
ment of a U S .  BMD would be to build more missiles. Since 
most believe that at least a smalt fraction of missiles will slip 
through the defense, the Soviets would likely increase their 
offensive forces to increase the chances that, even under the 
worst conditions, enou gh missiles would get through to complete 
their leaders’ objectives. If the objective is the destruction 
of U.S. cities, this will be a fairly easy task; if, however, the 
objective is to attack U.S. military assets, BMD could make this 
a much more difficult task, for reasons that will be discuss*< 
in the next section. In any case, it is reasonable to assume that 
if the Soviets were faced with a potential BMD, they will begin an 
offensive arms build-up, as would the United States if the situation 
were reversed.
Another countermeasure available to the offense is the use of
fast-burn boosters in the initial phase of lift-off. We have
already mentioned the necessity of destroying a significant number
of missiles in the boost-phase, as well as the difficulty in doing
this because of the time constraints involved. You will recall that
current missiles complete boost in three to five minutes, around
300-500 km above the earth. Testimony before the Fletcher
Committee indicated, however, that this period could be shortened
to 40-50 seconds, with boost ending at 80 km. This would mean that
the missiles would have to be lighter, of course, and would carry
fewer warheads and decoys, but one group of analysts suggests that
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this penalty would only be 10—15X Fast-burn boosters seem to be
an effective response to most types of Directed Energy Weapons, since
(some (chemical lasers and x-ray lasers are incapable of penetrating 
the atmosphere, and others (excimer, and Free-Electron lasers, as 
well as Neutral Particle Beams) face severe beam dispersion problems 
when their energy beams enter the atmosphere. This countermeasure 
would also effectively defeat kinetic kill vehicles and conventional 
rockets based in space, since there wouldn't be enough time for the 
interceptor to reach the target.
Another countermeasure effective against boost-ph 'se intercept 
would be increased maneuverability of the missiles. In particular, 
rapid starts and stops, known as "jinking", would make it difficult 
for the defense to determine an intercept point for the targets.
As has been mentioned, once the missile has a chance to deploy 
its warheads, it will also deploy hundreds of decays, which will make 
the major task of mid-course intercept that of discriminating 
threatening objects from "dummies." Another technique would be 
to encase all of the deployed objects, decoys, and warheads alike, 
in balloons coated with a reflective material. This measure, known 
as anti-simulat ion, would make it impossible for the defense to 
tell the treatening objects from the non-threatening ones using 
normal passive means of discrimination. Other means available 
include the use of aerosols or debris to obscure the warheads from 
the sensors necessary to acquire targets and direct the interception 
devices.
There are other passive means by which the offense could make 
the defense's task more difficult. Missile boosters could be 
hardened to withstand more heat and pressure than is currently the 
case; again, this would involve a weight penalty for the offense,
but it isn't likely to be substantial. Missiles could be "spun" 
rotating them so that no one single point would endure the f1uence 
of an energy beam. And, the enemy could precede an attack with a 
few nuclear blasts in order to tryto blind the crucial sensors of 
the BMD, or otherwise disrupt the environment in which the defense 
would have to function. This is a process known as "red-out".
The final response that the offense could avail itself of would
be the development of the means for direct defense suppress ion--the
ability to attack the system itself. Already, the Soviets maintain
an active program in the Anti-Satel1ite(ASAT) research, which is
widely regarded as more advanced than our own. If American efforts
to develop a BMD continue to expand, this ASAT program will certainly
be increased as well. Since some of the BMO system will have to be
space-based, they will have to be protected against such direct-
ascent ASAT's, as well as other means of sabotage, for example,
space mines. In addition, the components of the BMO system must
be protected from exactly the type of DEW concepts that it will
consist of. One rule which seems universal thus far is that any
BMD concepts suggested so far would be more effective against other
35systems like itself, than against ballistic missiles. As noted
by the APS Panel on DEW, "Directed energy weapons with capabilities
below those needed for many ballistic missile defense applications
36can threaten space-based assets of a defensive system." It is 
rather ironic that we might actually develop the capacity to wipe 
ouw * BMD system before we even develop the system itself. It 
seems clear, as well, that if BKD is going to have a chance to complete
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its mission effectively, it must not onlv develop the ability to 
negate a nuclear attack, it must also u a b l e  to defend itself 
against a wide variety of direct attacks. The Fletcher Commission 
on this point only suggested exploration of conventional means of 
weapons defense--evasion, proliferation, hardening, etc.
As can be seen, the technical challenges to building a 
successful Ballistic Missile Defense are daunting. Many concepts 
are still only that--concept s . Their feasibility must still be 
proven even at the most basic level of physics. Others are more 
advanced, but face problems in engineering and logistics, such as 
lasers that are too heavy to be put into orbit. Through ail of 
this uncertainty runs the possibility that the electronic means to 
integrate the entire system, and connect it to outside authorities 
may not be available for decades. And, the entire system must also 
find ways to protect itself from a hostile and responsive adversary.
None of this is to say that it cannot be done eventually, though 
that possibility must be kept in mind. Rather, it is to put the 
program and its stated objectives into perspective against what it 
is and what is likely to be possible so far as we can tell. Most 
of us would like to believe that technology will soon provide us 
with 11 assured survival", but there is currently no basis for 
believing that it will. Moreover, it is unlikely that technology 
will ever be able to ensure our security alone, no matter how 
rapidly advances occur; the reasons for this have little to do 
with technology, and are political in essence. It is to these 
considerations that we now turn.
Ill
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
At the time of President Reagan's Star Wars speech, and in the 
following months as differ* t reactions were formulated and elaborated 
on, there was little doubt that the President had proposed a radical 
departure from the traditional ways in which American officials 
thought of nuclear war. The White House was explicit on the 
reasoning behind this break from tradition: The President and his 
advisors had long considered the prevailing principle of nuclear 
balance, that of offensive deterrence, or Mutually Assured 
Destruction, to be both suicidaliy foolish and immoral. This 
rationale quickly gave rise to "assured survival", the flashword 
for the concept of defensive deterrence which was supposed to 
replace MAD. Though other justifications have since been forwarded 
for supporting the renewed drive for BMD, usually with an eye toward 
advocating defensive systems which might be less than suitable for 
meeting the President's lofty goals, these arguments should not be 
confused with Reagan's original intent, which seemed heartfelt and 
pure, and can be summed nicely in the question he put to the American 
people: "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?"
Mutually Assured Destruction, of course, asserts that nuclear 
war can be prevented if each side possesses enough weapons that, 
even after a first-strike by the opponent, the) could deliver a
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retaliatory blow capable of unacceptable destruction. Neither side 
would be willing to risk the danger of a nuclear exchange if they 
knew beforehand that the consequences would be disastrous for their 
own society and thus both are deterred fro;n actions that mignt lead 
to such an exchange. The problem with this rationale, for the 
President and many others, is that it is so fatalistic in nature; 
the only response to a devastating attack is to wreak equal 
devastation, and thus, in the end both countries are quite literally 
at each other's mercy. Such a thought does not sit well with any of 
us, moreso if one is basically distrustful of the Soviet Union's 
ultimate intentions and designs on the world. Furthermore, it is 
argued that th threat of HAD is so fantastic that it offers little 
actual deterrence beyond that of stopping an all-out assult on the 
U .S . mainland•
Though an uncomfortable arrangement, assured destruction has 
held for over twenty-five years; nobody has come up with a better 
way of managing the unpleasant reality of the nuclear world: two 
mutually vulnerable superpowers, each capable of wiping out the 
other in a single blow. President Reagen's vision for the future, 
his goal of "assured survival", would alter this reality by 
defending the United States from a Soviet missle attack. No longer 
would we have, as the only means of preventing a devastating assult, 
to rely on threats to do the same. No longer would we have to live 
with the knowledge that our survival lay in the hands of the enemy. 
Whatever else may be said about the President's ambition, it certainly
seems noble
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The problem with assured survival, however, is that 
the defenses must truly be perfect, while the offense could 
tolerate marginal, or even significant imperfection. Because 
of the enormous destructive power of today's nuclear weapons, 
if even a few warheads made it through the defensive shield 
and exploded over American cities, it would be a disaster un­
paralleled in the history of mankind. Against today's current 
Soviet force levels, around 1400 ICBMs and 8,000 warheads, a 
BMD which was 99X effective would still fail to stop 80 incoming 
warheads; if even half of these were aimed at cities and 
actually detonated on target, the results would be unquest­
ionably tragic.
The present state of technology, combined with the fact that 
there are a multitude of countermeasures that the Soviets could 
avail themselves of, makes even a 90Z effective BMD a matter 
of immense speculation. It seems inconceivable, at this 
point, that we will ever be capable of constructing a I00X 
effective missile shield which the Soviets could not in some 
way thwart. But even if we could, this would still not grant 
us assured survival. A BMD system would only defend against 
ICBMs, and would be incapable of stopping nuclear attack by 
other means of delivery, iuch as enemy bombers armed with 
ALCMs, or depressed-trajectory ballistic missiles launched 
by submarines. In addition, there are a host of other means 
of aggression which would be Impervious to even the most ef­
fective Ballistic Missile Defense, such as biological warfare.
In short, the goal of "assured survival" based on technology
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is absurd. Technology will never stand still, and its prolif­
eration is likely to continue on giving each side new ways 
to threaten each other and defend themselves. We must be
wary of what Sidney Drell has called "the fallacy of the last 
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move." Above all, we must recognize that our survival in 
the modern age is in esserce a political problem. Though 
technology plays a role, our continued survival depends mostly 
on our ability to manage an adversarial relationship at a 
time when co-existence is thrust upon us. This is the stuff 
of statesmanship, not physics and engineering.
Despite all this, the President still had clung to the 
original justification for his Star Wars plan. Others close 
to Reagan profess the same hope for an impenetrable shield 
against Soviet aggression, such as Caspar Weinberger and 
General James Abrahamson, director of the SDIO. There is no 
reason to suspect that they do not, at least in part, share 
the President's optimism for the future, but it is almost 
certain that they have other motives as well, namely the con­
tinuation of a research and development program which may
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lead to the deployment of imperfect defenses. There is an 
obvious political advantage however, to selling the new BMD 
program on the hopes that it may someday make nuclear weapons 
"impotent and obsolete," and the president's science advisor, 
George Keyworth, has openly admonished those SDI supporters 
who talk of anything less: "...if these arguments continue to be 
used as the basis to achieve congressional and allied support... 
the opportunity for strategic change- and the President's
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3 9objective- is lost."
Keyworth's fears notwithstanding, most analysts who support 
the Strategic Defense Initiative do so on the basis of a lesser, 
perhaps intermediary goal of "linited defense". Limited defense 
would involve the use of BMDs to protect primarily "counter- 
force" targets, such as ICBM silos or defense command instal­
lations, and is sometimes referred to as "point defense". The 
idea of point defense is one part of damage limitation doctrine, 
which states that, in the event of a nuclear war, the United 
States must take whatever actions necessary to protect both 
the population and industrial infrastructure, as well as military 
assets. Population and industrial centers would be defended 
primarily by "passive" means, such as civil defense evacuation, 
sheltering, and so forth; military assets would be actively 
protected by BMD.
Military assets have several characteristics which make 
them candidates for potential BMD protection. They are, to 
a certain extent, expendable; the defense needn't be perfect, 
since the loss of some of the targets is excepcable, and indeed 
expected. Th y are capable of being dispersed, so that more 
than one potential target is not in the blast area of a single 
enemy warhead, and are thus not subject to the same indiscriminate 
damage that urban areas are. Finally, they can be hardened 
to the effects of a nuclear blast, requiring greater and 
greater accuracy from the incoming warheads in order to destroy 
them. Cities and industrial complexes are considered "soft" 
targets, and would be ravaged by a single hit or near-miss;
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"hard" targets such as military assets, however, might benefit 
from the limited protection of an imperfect defense.
The desire for BHD protection of such counterforce assets 
stems from fears of a disarming Soviet first-strike. During the 
late 1970's some analysts and politicians, many of whom are 
now members of the current Administration, charged that the 
Soviets had used the period of detente and the SALT I and II 
negotiations to gain an advantage over the United States in 
nuclear conflict capabilities. They pointed to a U.S.S.R. 
advantage in throw-weight, as well as the increased accuracy 
of the new generation of Soviet ICBHs, as proof of their 
intention to seek the ability to dominate a limited nuclear 
exchange. In particular, they feared that the Soviets could 
soon exercise a surgical first-strike against U.S. ICBHs, 
holding enough firepower in reserve to threaten U.S. cities. 
Devastated by the Soviet assault, the U.S. could not release 
its few remaining missiles against Soviet cities for fear of 
massive reprisal. We would be disarmed and held bpstagei We 
would "lose" a limited nuclear war. The term "window of 
vulnerability" was coined to describe the assymetry in U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. forces that purportedly would allow this to happen.
The Snowcroft Commission addressed this point explicitly
in theit 1983 report, concluding that the fears of a Soviet
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first-strike were exaggerated. Noting that the U.S. maintained 
an effective deterrent in our nuclear submarine fleet, 
the Commission suggested several methods available for decreasing 
the vulnerability of U.S. land-based ICBMs: increased hardening,
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emphasizing mobility, and deceptive basing. In addition, a 
greater emphasis on missile accuracy, particularly for our 
sea-based strategic forces, should give us the ability to 
answer a limited Soviet first-strike against U.S. ICBMs 
with a similar strike against the remainder of their missiles. 
The Snowcroft Commission seemed particularly skeptical of the 
potential for BMD to afford any greater margin of security 
to U.S. land-based assets, than was available through the 
modernization of strategic forces already on-line or in develop­
ment .
Yet the Future Security Strategies Study Team recommends
the pursuit of an ”internediary" BMD capability, as well as
many of the measures suggested by Snowcroft: "A satisfactory
deterrent requires a combination of more discriminating and
effective offensive systems to respond to enemy attacks plus
defensive systems to deny the achievement of enemy attack 
4 t
objectives." Other BMD supporters make similar arguments 
for a deterrence based on a mix of offensive and defensive 
forces. They argue that defensive systems would create uncer­
tainty in the minds of Soviet planners about their ability to 
achieve their objectives in a first-strike.
But, as Reagan noted in his March 1983 address to the 
nation, "If paired with offensive systems, they (BMD forces) 
can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one 
wants that." The problem is that, although BMD itself seems 
rather non-threatening, if deployed unilaterally along with 
modernised offensive systems, they have the clear potential
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for contributing crucially to a first-strike capacity. If a 
nation could exercise a fairly effective surgical strike against 
an adversary-- particularly one which relies most heavily on 
land~?ased ICBMs, as the Soviets do-- they might then rely on 
their defensive systems to protect them against the weakened 
retaliatory strike. The BMD would be the ace-in-the-hoie; 
since the assaulted country might not have enough forces left 
in reserve to overwhelm the defense, they would have no other 
choice than to surrender. Alternatively, if b j t h countries 
had partially effective BMDs deployed, each side might be 
tempted to strike first in moments of crisis, lest they be 
caught with their missiles still in the silo. Regardless of 
the circumstances, any deployment of BMD by either side w o u d  
necessitate a launch-on-warning policy by the other. Soma 
other likely responses to an opponent’s deployment of BMD 
would be a rapid build-up of offensive forces, and increased 
emphasis on targeting of countervalue sites-- cities and 
urban-industrial areas.
In sum, BMD would undoubtedly increase the survivability 
of either side's land-based military assets, but would also 
call into question the retaliatory-strike capability of the 
other side. This would greatly decrease the present system 
of crisis stability which is premised on notions of MAD, since 
from the standpoint of security of the homeland, both sides 
are apt to value their ability to retaliate much more jealously 
than any irst-strike capacity. This is exacerbated by the 
prudent tendency for both sides to project the oppossing side's
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capabilities at their optimal level, while pessimistically viewing 
their own (worst-case analysis).
Proponents of BHD clearly recognize the dilemma presented
here. Repeatedly, they stress the need for cooperation between
the superpowers :n moving fro** offensive to deftnsiv deter- 
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rence. They stress the need for bi-lateral deployment of 
BMD systems, and collateral arms control measures to limit 
the growth of offensive arsenals, since either side could 
torpedo any plans for shifting to ”defensive deterrence” by 
extensive offensive proliferation, or by pre-emptively striking 
at the other's BMD system while it is in the process of being 
deployed. However, it must be recognized that the other 
party's cooperation will only come if they feel unthreatensd 
by the advances of the opponent, and if their own interests 
are served in the long run.
Absent this type of orderly cooperation on BMD, both sides 
will continue to mistrust the other's intentions, and both will 
likely read to the introduction of BMD w d h  proliferation and 
hostile counter measures. Both will also continue their ag­
gressive research and development programs into strategic 
defense technologies. In a :urious yet common paradox of the 
arms race, neither side is likely to experience much of a net 
benefit from the eventual deployment of BMDs, yet both will 
vigorously pursue them for fear ;>f breakthroughs by the opponent. 
Strategic defense theorists are cognizant of the substantial 
lead times that would be involved in engineering and then 
deploying an extensive BMD, but have yet to propose how an
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orderly transition to defensive deterrence could possibly 
take place during an extended period of intense defensive 
weapons competition, offensive arms build-up, and mutual dis­
trust, particularly since most of these individuals are also 
very skeptical of the arras control process.
The Political Impact of SDI
President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative
following the conclusion of the Fletcher and Hoffman Committee
studies which, in effect, offered conditional endorsement of
an oblique policy already proposed by the President in a nation-
& 3
wide address. Although it is constantly asserted that the
SDI is only a research program intending to explore the pos-
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sibility of a future BHD, it has already hau an impact on the
East-West security relationship, and can be expected to continue
doing so. Moreover, as SDI progresses, it will begin
to impact significantly on the characteristics of the force
structures of both superpowers, and the orientation of their
general defense policies. The political impact of such an
active program to develop missile defenses ought to be fully
considered before we commit ourselves to research which might
well result in a dead end. We must also keep in mind the fact
that the Soviets have an active program of BND research, though
4 5
it is not, by most accounts, quite as advanced as our own.
The first and most obvious political impact of SDI will 
be its continued effect on arms control measures. A robust 
program of research on BMD obviously cells into question our 
commitment to the ABN Treaty, and will eventually require
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either substantial modification of abrogation. This wi in 
turn, cast a shadow over any future nrms control meast s.
The SDI program is already very close to violating the terms
of the Treaty. As one analyst notes, "...the very sise of
even the early phases of the exploratory effort will tend to
create enormous pressures to demonstrate concrete results with
great public fanfare-- demonstrations which ate bound to have
unfortunate repercussions on concurrent efforts to reach a modus
vivendi with the Soviets through diplomatic means." The role
of such demonstrations in maintaining continued congressional
and public support for such an expensive and long-term program
would be cr d a l  for the continued funding of the SOI program.
Already, such demonstrations have been scheduled, though they are
asserted to be for ASAT purposes, and thus within the limits
4 6imposed by the ABM Treaty. The splitting of legal hairs in 
this manner probably impresses the Soviets very little, but 
it is unlikely that we will even be able to rely on lawyering 
by smoke and mirrors to keep us within the bounds of the 
Treaty for vary long.
While the SDI program calls into question American com­
mitment to the AIM Treaty, there are serious questions regarding 
the Soviet commitment as W' ’1. As previously noted, the Soviets 
have maintained their own active BHD program. In particular, 
some officials are concerned with developments such as the 
ABM-X~3, which may provide the U.S.S.R. with a mobile (but 
very limited) BMD capability, and with the construction of the 
Krasnyorsk radar.*7 The development of mobile AIM* systemu is
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expiessly forbidden by Che Treaty, end Che Krasnyptsk*radar* 
violates Che porvisions because it is not located on the 
periphery of the Soviet territory, and it is not oriented out­
ward; thus, it nay be intended to provide the Soviets with an 
ABM battle nanagenent capability, though it is nore likely 
intended just to fill a gap in their early-warning radar 
system. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union and the United States 
are equally guilty of brushing up against the spirit of the 
ABM Treaty, and have both thus placed it in jeepordy. Absent 
any agreements in the Standing Consultative Committee to modify 
the Treaty in order to accomodate their respective interests, 
the United States and Soviet Union can probably kiss it good­
bye. Not only will this mean the failure of the most significant 
U.S.-Soviet arms agreement to date, it will impede the op­
portunity for any future accords as well.
This impact on future attempts to remtehraivma<conteol
agreements will be a particularly sticky problem for proponents
of SDI. As already mentioned, BMO supporters emphasise the
need to pair the deployment of defenses with limits on of-
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fensive arms. This is the only way to ensure that the other
side will not "build-up" their missiles to a level sufficient
to overwhelm the defensive system, as even the chairmen of the
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Fletcher and Hoffman panels have acknowledged. But the 
suggestion that the Soviets (or the United States, for that 
matter) would agree to offensive arms limitations while faced 
with the prospect of an opponent's potential BMD is nothing 
less than silly. Some officials in the Reagan Administration
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have suggested that the SD'. program provides the United States 
with a bargaining chip with which to draw the Soviets into an 
agreement on limiting strategic forces, but at the same time, 
they have insisted that SOI is not open to negotiation. How 
the White House intends to avail itself of such a "bargain­
ing chip" which they simultaneously refuse to bargain away has 
yet to be explained. Officials point to recent progress in INF 
talks, but these negotiations are separate in substance from 
START and other initiatives to reduce central strategic forces, 
and the new Soviet posture on European-based forces stems 
from considerations very remote from the U As
one especially prominent group on analysts has noted, the
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President's choice, in the end, is either SOI or arms control.
The second likely political impact of the SDI, and the 
Soviet BMD program, will be the stimulation of an intensive 
arms race. Not only would prospective BMDs lead the super­
powers to begin building up their missile forces, but there 
would also be a competition in emerging defensive weapons, and 
also countermeasures to negate those defenses, not to mention 
counter-countermeasures, and so forth. The history of man is 
replete with innovations which were thought to be the final 
step in the realm of defense, only to be promptly overcome 
by other innovations* and there is no reason whatsoever to 
auspose that this pattern would not continue through a BMD 
regime of competition.
As 8DX continues, so will the pressures for deployment of 
one type or another. Harvey Brooks notes that "The sise and
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duration of the SDI effort imply the creation of enormous
vested interests against program changes and the necessity
for a continuous selling job on the part of several successive
52
administrations." Already, an emerging "Star Wars lobby" 
has begun to hammer away at the need for continuing the program; 
this lobby will undoubtedly grow as the program grows. The 
potential for such a broadly based program as SDI to create its 
own political momentum and to use the political process as a 
means of guarenteeing its continued existence, regardless of 
how infeasible BMD may become, should be a cause for concern.
In 1966, President Johnson approved the deployment of limited 
ABMs, not because of a rational policy decision that such a 
system best suited U.S. security interests, but as a political 
compromise between the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who 
favored deployment on a wide scale, and civilian defense
authorities, led by Robert McNamara, who oppossed such de-
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ployment. This point is underscored by the absurdity of the 
justification that was offered by the Administration for the 
decision to approve limited ABM deployment: as a protection 
against Chinese nuclear forces; the Chinese have yet to develop 
a significant 1CBM capability.
There are some who openly welcome a broadly based U.S.- 
Soviet competition such as BMD would entail. They argue that 
the comparative strength of the U.S. economy, as well as our 
generally accepted advantage in technological innovation, will allow us 
to dominate such an arms race. But they ignore the fact that, 
while the 8oviet Union is at an economic disadvantage, they
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enjoy the advantages of a political system which allows the 
leadership to demand concessions from the people in order to 
allow for greater defense expenditures, BHD would be unquest­
ionably the single most expensive peace-time endeavor in the 
history of modern government! and would require that sacrifices 
be made on the part of the general public. Every year in the 
United States, the setting of the defense budget is a major 
public spectacle, open to all the rancoring and deal-making of 
partisan politics. It is little wonder that, despite our greater 
economic strength, we have never been able to outspend the 
Soviet Union on defense in the postwar period, and it would be 
folly to believe that we could do so now.
Another political implication of SOI concerns the issue 
of opportunity costs, involved whenever a nation commits itself 
to a long-term policy. The original five-year expenditure 
proposal for SD1 was $26 billion, and the eventual absolute 
coat will likely approach $1 trillion; it may even go substan­
tially higher, dipending on the results of current and future 
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research. This amount of money for a single defense program 
boggles the mind, but we must also consider alternative programs 
and options which will be passed over as a reiult of such a 
substantial commitment; In particular, many near-term options 
for improving U.S. defense capabilities and overall American 
security will have to be forgone as a result of SD1; many at­
tractive alternatives across the spectrum of defense-related 
policy will naeaasarily be sacrificed for the distant hopes 
of an affective BHD, even though the most effective>BMD will
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be incapable of projecting us from other forms of aggression*
Currently, the Administration must choose whether to 
pursue SDI further or initiate the types of offensive force 
modernizations proposed bv the Snowcroft Commission. They could 
attempt to do both, and have indeed made statements to the effect 
that this is what they plan to do, but in the end, one or the 
other of these options will suffer. Defense expenditures do 
not originate from an endless pool, and trade-offs between 
SDI and force modernizations will have to be made. More im­
portantly, as mentioned earlier, the pairing of an aggressive 
BMD development program with offensive force improvements can 
be seen as fostering an aggressive policy, and will only provoke 
the strongest response from the Soviet Union. In such an in­
stance, the resulting Soviet build-up will be so severe as to 
ruin any chance of shifting to a state of "defensive" deter­
rence, except perhaps in the most remote future; any realistic 
justification for SDI will likely fall to pieces.
A fourth political implication of SDI runs directly counter 
to one of President Reagan's stated objectives in initiating 
the program, that of "providing future presidents with choices 
regarding future strategic decisions."^* As one analyst 
notes, the type of research belug done in conjunction with 
SDI was already baing done in several separate places, though 
at lower levels of intensity; by integrating this research and 
pushing it along at a more rapid pace, the White House is 
forcing the SDIO to begin formulating tentative system designs 
and prospective strategies, even thuogh the jury is still out
( 5 4 )
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on much of the basic research. In short, the fervor with 
which the Administration is pushing the SDI may be forcing 
premature-dee 1^ions on how to proceed.
For instance, a quick look at the relative appropriations 
within the SDIO budget makes it clear that the majority of 
emphasis has been placed on longer-term technologies, such as 
Directed Energy Weapons.**^ However, one of the greatest fears 
driving those who support the SDI is the fear of a rapid 
Soviet deployment of a nation-wide BMD system. In this instance, 
it would be necessary to deploy quickly our own system, which 
would have tc rely mostly on nearer-term terminal defenses.
But because these types of defenses have currently been de- 
emphasiced by the SDIO, that option might not be sufficient to 
soothe our fear of the Soviet BMD system, anc we might be 
faced with the frightening prospect of a real Soviet advantage 
in BMD. Though the most recent DOD budget proposals seem to 
indicate a return to interest in terminal defense-concepts which 
are much closer to feasibility (due probably to the greater 
interest in near-term deployments), this example illustrates 
the manner in which a research program which is given too 
much emphasis in the beginning might progress in a way that 
closes off options for the future.
A final political Implication of SDI is that it con­
tributes to the mentality, particularly prevelant in the United States, 
the technology can be used to guarantee our safety from e 
hostile adversary. As I stated before, I do not believe this 
is so, and further, to pretend it is only turns our attention
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away from less spectacular, but ultimately more effective
measures of diplomacy. The attractive proposals and the grand
hopes of the SDI are, as two writers put it, "a triumph of
wishful thinking and fantasy over reality; an act of surrender
to che promise held out by technical fixes as the perferred
means of dealing with nuclear arms and a difficult adversary-
two situations that must ultimately be dealt with by politico 
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means.
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CONCLUSIONS
From the preceding discussion we can draw the following 
summations: First, several technologies have emerged over the 
past fifteen years which could greatly improve our ability 
to build missile defenses, though many of these technologies 
have yet to be proven beyond the levi l of demonstrating the 
physics involved. Moreover, we have yet to see the presentation 
of a feasible architecture for even a marginally effective 
BMD, and there still exists skepticism about our ability to 
develop the computing capabilities and software necessary to 
integrate the thousands of components that would likely con* 
stitute a multilayered defense such as the one envisioned 
by SDI. Other dilemmas must be solved as well: arranging 
for the regular testing of different components, software, 
and the system as a whole, developing a way to fulfill the 
immense power requirements of many of the different components, 
some of which will be in orbit, and providing for the main* 
tenance and repair of remote, space*based components. The 
effectiveness of any BMD would be reduced by a variety of 
countermeasures available to the olfense, including prolifer* 
ation of strategic missiles, fast-barn boosters, hardening of
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m i s s i l e s ,  increased maneuverability, and the use of  decoys, 
chaff, and other "penetration aids." All BMDs would be subject 
to direct att ack.
Second, though the original goti of the new emphasis on 
developing BHD was to replace deterrence by MAD with "assured 
survival", this would require perfect defense, which is clearly 
unattainable. There is currently no basis for believing that 
we could someday build an impenetrable BMD, and even if we could, 
it wouldn't stop nuclear strikes delivered by means other than 
strategic ballistic missiles. Furthermore, even a perfect 
defense against nuclear weapons would be ineffective against 
other means of aggression, such as chemical or germ warfare, 
or terrorism. Other juscifications for BHD have been forwarded, 
apart from the President's goal of perfect defense, which argue 
that a state of deterrence bated on a mix of offensive and 
defensive forces would decrease the likliehcod of either side 
attempting a first-strike. But such an arrangement would 
raise doubts as to the retaliatory strike capability of each 
nation's forces, and would thu/# create an incentive for first- 
launch, not as a pre-emptive move, but to avoid getting caught 
with moat of one's missiles sitting in the silos. In addition, 
it would be necessary for both aides to adopt a firm policy 
of launch-on-warning. BMD proponents recognise that the only 
way to move from offensive to partially-defensive deterrence 
would be through cooperation between the superpowers. But they 
have not figured out yet how this could be done in the face 
of the mutual distrust and arma proliferation that would likely
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accompany any attempt by either the United States or the 
Soviet Union to begin deploying a nation-wide BMD.
Third, though the SDI is currently presented only as a 
research effort, it will continue to have adverse effects 
on East-West relations, as well as U.S. defense policy. In 
particular, it has already endangered the 1972 ABM Treaty, and 
will surely violate it outright as the near-term schedule 
for the program advances. This will cast doubt over any future 
attempts at arms control measures. The Soviets are to s are 
the blame for endangering the Treaty, as they maintain their 
own extensive BMD research effort, and they too have done 
things which call into question their commitment to the spirit 
of the Treaty. The SDI effort also increases the chances for 
an intensive, costly arms race in both offensive and defensive 
systems, and it will mean the sacrifice of certain near-term 
defense options which may be less spectacular than Star Wars, 
but more practical in the long run. SDI may also close off 
options for future policymakers by forcing premature decisions 
on which way to focus the present research efforts. Finally,
SDI deludes the American people into thinking that the answer 
to our security rests with technology, and turns attention 
away from the more mundane but necessary tasks of scotching 
for political solutions to our mutual vulnerability.
Although it is unclear that there will ever be benefits 
from the pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defenses, research in 
strategic defense will continue. Though the chances of constructing
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a perfect missile defense is highly unlikely, it cannot be 
precluded altogether. Perhaps some distant day, we will be 
able to build 1002 effective missile defenses, and perhaps the 
strategic relationship of the pover s-1 hat-be will allow for an 
orderly transition to defensive deterrence. Because we cannot 
now conceive of this ever being so is no reason to believe 
that it absolutely will not happen.
More importantly, neither superpower can presently afford 
to forego BMD research for fear of what the adversary may be 
up to. Simply put, BMD R&D will continue because there is no 
means presently available for banning it reliably. Current 
means of verifying arms control compliance do not, generally 
speaking, reach effectively into the laboratory. It would be 
relatively easy f o r one side or the other to agree to limits 
on missile defense research, and then cheat. Consequently, both 
the United States and the Soviet Union must continue their own 
R&U programs as a hedge against potential breakthroughs by the 
other.
This does not mean that we are doomed to be led down the 
BMD path by the lure of technology. There is ongoing debate 
concerning the effect of technology on the eventual defense 
postures of industrial nations, with many maintaining 
that it is some "technological imperative" which determines the 
weapons we build and which defense policies we then adopt.
One thorough treatment of this issue, by Johnathon Stein, 
refutes this position. Stein offers an historical analysis 
of the H-bomb decision, paralleling it with the present Star
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Wars debate. His conclusion is one that 1 share: "In the Soviet-
American arms race..•scientific innovation has occured more at
the behest of political stimuli than because of the lure(or
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creep) of technology." Of course, new technology must be 
precent for advances in weaponry, but without political de­
cisions to avail oneself of the advantages of this new technology, 
new weapons would not be produced. If this is the case, if 
the renewed push for BMD research and development is the result 
of political decision making, then perhaps it can be controlled 
by political measures as well.
Essentially, the problem is figuring out how to manage two 
competitive BMD research programs, and reduce the risks of 
either side misinterpreting the intentions of the other, as 
well as the risks of premature deployment and the subsequent 
offensive arms race that such a move would compel. Thera are, 
of course, no perfect solutions. I will suggest three separate 
policies, though, which might contribute to the stable navigation 
of BMD R6D$ the first two policies have been proposed by others, 
while the last one is my own suggestion.
1) Return to the type of R&D program which was in place 
before the President's "Star Wars" speech. Such an option has 
been suggested by Harvey Brooke, and the Stanford CI8AC team 
of Sidney Drell, Philip Parley, and David Holloway.*^
This would entail a return to a diffuse, leas costly 
program of research into various BMD concept • The advantage 
would be the elimination of any collectivised bureaucracy 
which will develop tendencies to feed its own growth. The
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R&D effort would be less visible, less spectacular, and most 
likely less provocative. As Brooks notes, "Neither (super­
power) can afford not to remain abreast of basic techno­
logical developments, to be at least in a position to accurately 
assess their potential military applications. However, this kind 
of assessment is probably better carried out in a low-key 
environment that avoids premature identification with specific 
system concepts, if only to avoid the creation of an unstop­
pable political momentum which interferes with rational decision- 
6 )
making." An additional benefit of this approach would be 
its obscurity. Yearly decisions on how much money to spend 
on such decentralized R&D would not be subject to the uncertanties 
of high politics, and would then probably be more consistent 
over the long-term.
2) This alternative option would involve the restructuring 
of the SDI program, at e much lower level of funding, with 
greater emphasis on basic research, and less money set aside 
for flashy demonstrations. An example is the FY 1986 alter­
native SDI budget introduced by Senators Dale Bumpers and 
William Proxmire. Though only calling for $1.9 billion, the
budget includes a thirty percent increase in the amount set
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aside for "basic research." As with the first option, this 
policy would reduce tensions caused by the furor over the 
present SDI program, and would also keep us within the bounds 
of the ABH Treaty.
3) The third policy propoaal would involve a cooperative 
research effort by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Specific­
ally, the two superpowers would combine their efforts in a
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low-profile effort to examine the different emerging technologies 
possibly suitable for missile defense. Though very much unlike 
anything in the past, such a policy would have several distinct 
advant ages.
First, such an effort would be a significant first step 
in the cooperation which strategic defense theorists feel 
is necessary to ensure an orderly transition from a non-BMD 
world to deterrence premised on defense.
Second, SDI supporters constantly stress that the use of
BMD is an act of defense, and implies no hostile intent.
Even Ronald Reagan has suggested that we "share" the secret
6 3
of BMD with the Soviets once we develop it ourselves.
To this, one might say, "if we're going to hand over the fruits 
of our labor, why not have them contribute their fair share."
In short, why should the U.S. and the Soviet Union match each 
other in BMD research expenditures, when they might be able 
to accomplish the same objectives, for as little as half the price?
Third, cooperative research would increase the probability 
that, if technology demonstrations must take place, and testing 
must occur which is ouside the established bounds of the 
ABM Treaty, the superpowers will then have a common understand­
ing of the purposes involved. If this were the case, both 
might be willing to ammend the ABM Treaty or suspend the 
provisions through agreement in the SCC.
Fourth, cooperative research would reduce the threat- 
perceptions which each side has of the other's BMD efforts, 
and perhaps contribute fundamentally to the suppression of
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a new and costly arms race.
Finally, as an unorthodox political errangenent, cooper 
ative research night help to restore the American people's 
trust in "dealing" with the Soviets, which is to say that we 
nay cone to recognise the prinacy of politics as a means to* 
ward a more peaceful and stable world.
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